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Asbestos ClailDs Facility: 
An Unprecedented, Private Alternative 
for Dispute Resolution 
I. The Crisis 
The inability of this nation's legal system 
to effectively and equitably compensate the 
victims of asbestos-related injuries has de-
veloped into a tragedy of catastrophic pro-
portions. At present, there are an estimated 
30,000 asbestos claims filed throughout 
the United States court system.! This 
number is increasing at a dramatic rate of 
approximately 500 additional claims each 
month. 2 Essentially, the court system is 
being overwhelmed_by asbestos litigation. 
This situation has led to an intense de-
bate as to how the problem should best 
be solved. It has become readily apparent 
that the United States court system is ill-
equipped to effectively resolve, in an ex-
pedient and judicious manner, the massive 
amounts of asbestos litigation. The enor-
mous number of suits presently burdening 
the judicial system has led to excessive de-
lays in dispute resolution. In the federal 
court system, a claimant can expect an 
average delay of three years between the 
filing of his claim and the initial trial date. 
As can be expected, those affected most by 
the delays are those persons with the most 
pressing and immediate needs- the injured 
worker. 
II. A Possible Solution-
The Creation of the Facility 
In 1982, asbestos producers and their in-
surance carriers found themselves faced 
with extensive disputes among themselves 
over which policies were responsible for 
paying particular claims. In light of pend-
ing litigation against the carriers and pro-
ducers, as well as potentially enormous ex-
penses for the defense of personal injury 
law suits, representatives of both the pro-
ducers and insurers began an extensive 
course of negotiations in an attempt to re-
solve the disputes. The disputes arose over 
an inherent peculiarity of the asbestos in-
jury; that is, it may not result in an identi-
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fiable injury for up to forty years after the 
exposure. 3 As a result of the latency of the 
injury, many of the insurers could not agree 
as to which company was liable for which 
producers during a specific period. Car-
riers who had previously insured the as-
bestos manufacturers held the position 
that their exposure was limited only to 
claims filed during the dates of coverage 
and that the asbestos-related injury did not 
"occur" until the symptoms had mani-
fested themselves in the claimant. Present 
carriers for the former asbestos producers 
had also denied culpability. It was their 
contention that the injury for which com-
pensation is entitled occurred only upon 
exposure, and thus they should not be held 
liable for present claims. In an effort to re-
solve the major dispute among the insur-
ance carriers, they ultimately agreed to di-
vide and contribute settlement payments 
to the Facility based upon the length of 
their policy coverage for each producer. 4 
Finally, on June 19, 1985, the represen-
tatives of fifty asbestos manufacturers and 
insurance carriers signed the final docu-
ment that formalized the creation of the 
Asbestos Claims Facility. The signing cul-
minated almost three years of intense ne-
gotiations. The negotiations were chaired 
by Harry Wellington, retired Dean of Yale 
Law School, who directed the meeting un-
der the auspices of the Center for Public 
Resources. The intent of this joint action 
by producers and carriers is to develop an 
unprecedented private sector solution to 
the asbestos personal injury problem. The 
Wellington Agreement, as the document is 
called by those familiar with the negotia-
tions, signifies the final resolution of a 
series of disputes between the former as-
bestos producers and their insurance car-
riers. 
It is anticipated that the creation of the 
Facility will offer a viable, voluntary alter-
native to the extremely costly and lengthy 
litigation process. A 1984 Rand Corpora-
tion study estimated that producers and 
insurers had already spent one billion dol-
lars in compensation and legal aid expenses 
over the previous ten years. 5 The study 
concluded that the average claimant only 
received thirty-seven cents for every dollar 
spent by these same producers and car-
riers.6 Of course, these numbers are heav-
ily skewed downward by the mounting 
costs of legal representation on behalf of 
the defendant producers, but the effect of 
this misallocation of resources is felt mostly 
by the injured worker. Proponents of the 
Facility claim that a proper allocation of 
resources, preferably through the Claims 
Facility, will result in more benefits being 
disbursed to the claimant. John F. Shea, 
Jr., Vice-President and Claims Counsel for 
Aetna Life & Casualty, has estimated that 
the ultimate cost of present and future 
Winter, J986/The Law Forum-9 
claims to insurers could run somewhere 
between 4 and 170 billion dollars.7 The 
disparity involved in this estimate is largely 
due to the unpredictable nature of puni-
tive damage awards by juries and the un-
certainty of how many workers were harm-
fully exposed to asbestos. 
Specifically, it is proposed that the As-
bestos Claims Facility will: 
- Provide plaintiffs with an efficient 
and more equitable alternative to 
the court system. 
- Establish a central and predictable 
forum in which to file and have 
claims evaluated. 
- Reduce legal costs for plaintiffs and 
defendants alike by encouraging and 
coordinating the handling and set-
tlement of asbestos-related injury 
claims. 
- End disputes over insurance cover-
age by establishing a comprehensive 
coverage plan to fund liabilities and 
expenses in connection with asbestos-
related injuries. 
- Allow producers and insurers to 
manage their liabilities and to pur-
sue realistic financial planning for 
the future. S 
Naturally, there are many who question 
how the Facility proposes to attain these 
goals. To better understand this, it is nec-
essary to examine the Facility and the pro-
posed claims process. 
III. The Facility 
The Asbestos Claims Facility is a pri-
vate, nonprofit organization, incorporated 
under the laws of Delaware. The member-
ship of this corporation consists of the 
forty-five named signatories of the Well-
ington Agreement, as well as five unnamed, 
confidential signatories who have condi-
tionally joined with an option to exercise 
full membership by December, 1986.9 
The names of these confidential signatories 
will only be released if they exercise their 
option to join the Facility. 
Assuming leadership of the Facility will 
be Wade H. Coleman, former Senior Vice-
President of Citicorp, who will serve as 
President and Chief Executive Officer. lo 
The Facility will be governed by a thirteen-
member board of directors comprised 
mainly of representatives from the named 
producers and insurers. 11 At present, the 
Facility is expected to be headquartered in 
Princeton, New Jersey with a regional of-
fice in San Francisco, California. 12 Cur-
rent projections estimate the Facility to be 
fully staffed and operational by February, 
1986. The Facility expects to employ ap-
proximately 140 people with an annual 
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operations budget expected to approach 
twelve to fifteen million dollars.13 Obvi-
ously, this figure does not contemplate ag-
gregate amounts to be paid to claimants. 
IV. The Claims Process 
A. The Member's Liability 
By signing the Wellington Agreement, 
each signatory designates the Facility as its 
sole representative to administer and ar-
range on its behalf for the evaluation, set-
tlement, payment or defense of any claim 
filed against one of its members. Gener-
ally, liability is shared among the mem-
bers as dictated by a formula that has been 
devised by an independent consulting 
firm. The formula is based upon each pro-
ducer's previous litigation experience. 
The concept is to apportion to each pro-
ducer a share of all liability payments and 
expenses. 14 The percentage share assigned 
to each producer is applied to each claim 
paid by the Facility.ls It is important to 
note that the percentage assigned to each 
producer is based upon the entire market 
share of all asbestos producers. Thus, a 
member's percentage of liability is calcu-
lated on an industry-wide basis and not by 
what percentage of asbestos he produced 
in relation to other members. This rule re-
flects the Facility's general policy that it 
will duly compensate a victim for the lia-
bility incurred only by its members and 
not by all manufacturers of asbestos. Of 
course, it is the carrier who will actually 
compensate the victim, but the agreement 
does stipulate that the producers will be 
responsible for awards and expenses paid 
to a claimant in excess of policy limits. 16 
B. The Claimant's Role 
Participation in the Asbestos Claims Fa-
cility is purely voluntary on the claimant's 
part. It is non-binding prior to the accep-
tance of a settlement and does not affect 
any legal rights a claimant may have against 
non-members. 17 Claimants have the right, 
but are not compelled, to employ their 
own counsel during the claims process. IS 
Counsel fees will remain a confidential 
matter between the attorney and the client. 
It is hoped that plaintiffs' attorneys will 
take into consideration the relative ease 
with which a claim can be settled and cor-
respondingly reduce their typical one-third 
share of the settlement. 
C. The Standard/or Compensation 
In order to have a compensable claim by 
the Facility's standards an individual must 
have an asbestos-related "impairment and 
dysfunction" from exposure to asbestos or 
asbestos-containing products of a Facility 
member. 19 The basic requirement of"im-
pairment and dysfunction" substantially 
removes from the Facility those workers 
who have been exposed to asbestos but do 
not currently suffer from a physical im-
pairment and disability. The level of dis-
ability is measured by pulmonary function 
values, which is the standard test to deter-
mine if such impairment has occurred. 
This standard has seemingly left out of 
the compensation scheme those claimants 
who have been diagnosed as having pleural 
thickening or pleural plaques and no inter-
stitial fibrosis. This group comprises a ma-
jority of all victims of asbestos exposure. 
However, a recent development in negoti-
ations by the Wellington Group, serving 
as interim liaison counsel until the Facility 
begins its operations, has given these vic-
tims some hope for future compensation. 
Since September 9, 1985, the Wellington 
Group has settled over twenty cases in 
California, Arkansas and Texas with claim-
ants who did not meet the "impairment 
and dysfunction" standard. 20 Settlements 
in these cases averaged $130,000.00 per 
claimant. 21 
D. The Claims Process 
A claim can be filed, at no cost to the 
claimant, at either the Facility's Princeton 
or San Francisco office by simply filling 
out a general information sheet. The basic 
file requirements for claim processing are: 
(a) work history, (b) dates of exposure to 
asbestos-containing products, and (c) trade 
names or manufacturers of the asbestos-
containing products. The Facility will 
process only asbestos claims relating to 
bodily injury and will not consider any 
claim for workers' compensation benefits 
or property damage. It should be noted 
that producers and insurers are presently 
re-evaluating the property damage issue, 
and that eligibility for workers' compensa-
tion or other disability benefits does not af-
fect a claimant's right to use the Facility. 22 
Interestingly, the Facility will compensate 
the victim for loss of consortium in appro-
priate cases. Furthermore, claims may be 
brought to the Facility concurrently with a 
court action against the Facility members. 
The statute of limitations on the court 
claim may be tolled as long as the claim is 
in the Facility process. 23 The claimants 
are free to choose between the Facility and 
court system at any time prior to accep-
tance of a settlement or binding alternative 
dispute resolution. 24 
Once a claim has been filed with the Fa-
cility, an evaluation will be conducted ac-
cording to pre-established guidelines by 
experienced claims personnel. Essentially, 
the claim will be evaluated based upon the 
level of impairment and dysfunction that 
is detected in relation to the level of expo-
sure to products manufactured by Facility 
members. The Facility will not compen-
sate an injured worker for any degree of in-
jury it deems was the result of exposure to 
products of non-members.25 In practical 
terms, this means that if a worker's level of 
impairment and dysfunction is determined 
to be "X" and the Facility determines that 
its members' products are responsible for 
30% of the worker's injury, the settlement 
offer will reflect a compensation generally 
along the line of 30% of "X". In essence, 
the Facility will not make the claimant 
whole for his asbestos-related injury. An 
injured party must still seek compensation 
against non-members through the court 
system. 
Once a claim is evaluated, a settlement 
offer will be proffered to the claimant. If 
the offer is not satisfactory, the claimant 
will have the opportunity to choose from a 
full range of mediation and arbitration 
techniques at no cost to himself. This pro-
cess is called the Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR) procedure, and it is currently 
being developed by the Facility in con-
junction with a representative group of 
plaintiffs' representatives. The ADR will 
provide an array of binding and nonbind-
ing arbitration procedures. If this process 
should fail and it is determined that a final 
settlement cannot be reached, the claimant 
can exercise his option to return to the 
court system or utilize a less expensive 
process of binding dispute resolution. One 
interesting aspect of the Facility that will 
dramatically reduce defense costs for its 
members is the current plan to retain local 
counsel for all members in specific areas. 
The concept is to have one defense team to 
represent all of the Facility'S members in a 
particular jurisdiction. 26 The practical ap-
plication of this method is to reduce the 
number of defense teams appearing in a 
single case from an average of twenty to 
just one. 
To date, the Facility has refused to uti-
lize a predetermined schedule of benefits 
such as those used for workers' compensa-
tion. Instead, the Facility will evaluate 
each claim separately on its merits. 27 
Ideally, the voluntary nature of the Facil-
ity and the claimant's right to return to the 
court system will ensure that settlement 
offers are fair and reasonable. The Facility 
does require that any final settlement is to 
include a full release of any claim for puni-
tive damages against its members and that 
any settlement accepted by a claimant is a 
full and final settlement against all Facility 
members. 28 
V. Criticisms 
As with any legal innovation, the Asbes-
tos Claims Facility has come under a great 
deal of scrutiny and criticism. Ronald L. 
Motley, a partner in Blatt & Fales, a South 
Carolina law firm which represents over 
5,000 asbestos claims nationwide, has 
taken exception to certain parts of the 
Wellington Agreement. He points out that 
the terms of the agreement by which a 
claimant must abide, strongly reflect the 
lack of involvement of victims and their 
representatives in the negotiations that re-
sulted in the establishment of the Facility. 
Mr. Motley has stated that those parts of 
the agreement that stipulate no punitive 
damage settlements, payment only for 
physical impairment and dysfunction, and 
all defendants settle or none, "looks like a 
Manville wish list." 29 
It has become 
readily apparent that 
the United States 
court system is 
ill-equipped to 
effectively resolve 
. . . the massive 
amounts of asbestos 
litigation. 
Motley's criticisms are shared by many 
who are representing the claimants' inter-
ests. It is only natural for adversary parties 
to be suspicious of one another, but many 
plaintiffs' attorneys feel they have just rea-
son to be wary of the Asbestos Claims Fa-
cility. They readily point out that the 
Wellington Agreement is a method of dis-
pute resolution devised by and for the de-
fendant asbestos producers. Some plain-
tiffs' counsel have expressed great concern 
over the fact that claimant representatives 
were only recently asked to partake in re-
fining certain portioris of the claims process 
and operation of the Facility. Proponents 
of the Facility counter by claiming that it 
was necessary for the defendant producers 
and carriers to resolve their internal prob-
lems before they could present this concept 
to potential claimants. 
Other representatives of the claimants' 
interests point out that certain actions and 
omissions on behalf of the Facility have 
amounted to acts of bad faith. As a case-in-
point, in Maine, stays of litigation have 
been sought in 260 cases by local counsel 
on behalf of Facility members. The intent 
is obvious; if the stays are granted, the 
claimants will find application to the Fa-
cility a much more appealing prospect. 
The claimants will be put in a situation 
whereby they will be willing to accept 
drastically reduced amounts of compensa-
tion for a quicker resolution of the claim-
all at a great savings to the Facility mem-
bers. The Facility's response to this charge 
is only that they have not authorized any 
blanket stays. Claimants and their repre-
sentatives also point out the Facility's de-
cision not to publicize the existence of the 
Facility on a nationwide basis, and its un-
willingness to incorporate into the body of 
the Agreement a stipulation not to seek 
legislative redress for the asbestos-injury 
compensation problem. These omissions 
are generally viewed as tactical decisions 
by the members to minimize their poten-
tialliability. However, some detractors of 
the Facility allege that the omissions indi-
cate the Facility'S unwillingness "to tell 
you they are here and how long they are 
going to be here." 
Other criticisms of the Facility are di-
rected at the terms of the Agreement itself. 
While the Facility has acknowledged that 
compensation of the claimants is based 
upon a liability share assigned to each 
member by independent analysis, the Fa-
cility has refused to divulge to the claimants 
exactly what percentage of liability is as-
signed to each member. This factor is in-
creasingly relevant in light of the fact that 
not all asbestos producers and their insur-
ers are members of the Facility. Most no-
tably, Johns-Manville, who was generally 
regarded as the world's leading asbestos 
producer, is not a member of the Facility. 
The evaluation of Manville's percentage 
ofliability by the Facility will be a signifi-
cant factor in any settlement offer it may 
provide. If the assessed share of liability 
for Manville is significant, it will reduce 
any offer made by the Facility proportion-
ately to Manville's perceived share. It 
should be noted that Johns-Manville is a 
conditional member of the facility and is 
awaiting disposition of its Chapter 11 re-
organization request. An open-ended ques-
tion in regard to this matter is whether, 
during the course of negotiations between 
the claimant and the Facility, the Facility 
will disclose its evaluation of the plaintiff's 
case at 100% of worth, the percentage of 
the Facility member's liability share rela-
tive to that 100% evaluation, the names of 
non-member manufacturers who the facil-
ity has determined to have contributed to 
the plaintiff's injuries, and the percentage 
of liability attributed to each such manu-
facturer. 
There is also some concern as to the the-
ory of insurance coverage utilized by the 
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Facility. Once policy limits are exhausted, 
the duty to compensate the claimant falls 
on the manufacturer. Some claimant rep-
resentatives feel that this could lead to a 
rash of bankruptcy petitions being filed by 
manufacturers in order to avoid paying the 
compensation. Proponents of the Facility 
note that the so-called "triple trigger" the-
ory is more than equitable. They readily 
point to the member insurer's willingness 
to cover, on a pro-rata basis, the gaps in in-
surance coverage caused by non-member 
insurers of member manufacturers. Critics 
reply by stating that the so-called "gap 
coverage" also applies against the insurer's 
total policy liability, thereby, accelerating 
the insurer's departure from the Facility. 
One final prevalent criticism of the Fa-
cility is that it has created a vehicle by 
which asbestos victims will be enticed by 
easily obtainable but low cash-amount set-
tlements. The theoretical argument is that, 
by accepting the anticipated low cash set-
tlements, the claimants are denying them-
selves the opportunity to make themselves 
"whole" as would exist under general tort 
theory. Proponents of the Facility counter 
by noting the voluntary nature of the Fa-
cility and that, if settlement offers are too 
low, nobody would utilize the Facility. 
VI. Conclusion 
The uniqueness of the Asbestos Claims 
Facility lies in the fact that it is a private 
sector attempt to resolve a basically legal 
issue. The members are not asking the 
courts or Congress to bail the industry out 
of its own responsibilities. This is certainly 
commendable in light of past developments 
in the automobile and transportation in-
dustry. The members hope that it will be 
an alternative to the judicial process that is 
attractive enough to the injured parties that 
they will select the Facility over the costly 
and time consuming litigation process. 
Undoubtedly, the Facility will provide 
savings for its members through cost re-
duction and spending containment. How-
ever, the purpose of the Facility should not 
be limited to expediting the needs of its 
members. The success of this concept rests 
largely on the willingness of the members 
to settle on legitimate claims and to settle 
at an amount satisfactory to both the plain-
tiff and the Facility member. Without a 
fair settlement procedure, plaintiffs will 
bypass the Facility and proceed directly to 
the courts. Obviously, it is in the Facility's 
best interest to properly compensate the 
claimants. Failure to do so will ultimately 
result in the failure of the Facility. 
Should the Asbestos Claims Facility 
prove to be successful, its future implica-
tions could be immense. A standard will 
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be set by which private industry may come 
to be expected to provide remedies for 
its own wrongs. Its effect on the judicial 
system will be just as telling. A workable 
method by which substantial amounts of 
similar-type litigation can be resolved could 
dramatically reduce the case load of an 
already overburdened trial system. Of 
course, the Facility is still in its infancy; its 
potential is immense but the possibility of 
failure is just as great. Its fate is predicated 
upon the willingness of both sides of the 
adversary process to communicate and 
mediate their differences. While there is 
nothing new about this formula, the As-
bestos Claims Facility is certainly a radical 
departure offorum in which the formula is 
to be tested. 
VII. ~eDnbership 
AC&S, Inc. 
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. 
American Universal Insurance Group 
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 
Bituminous Casualty Corp. 
Carey Canada, Inc. 
The Celotex Corporation 
Certain Teed Corp. 
C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc. 
CIGNA Property and Casualty 
Insurance Cos. 
Continental Corp. 
Crum & Forster 
Dana Corp. 
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. 
Employers Insurance of Wausau 
Fibreboard Corporation 
Fireman's Fund, Inc. 
First State Insurance Co. 
Flexitallic Gasket Co., Inc. 
The Flintkote Co. 
Genstar Corp. 
Harbor Insurance Co. 
Hartford Insurance Group 
H.K. Porter Company, Inc. 
Hopeman Brothers, Inc. 
Keene Corp. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
Lloyd's of London 
Maremont Corp. 
National Gypsum Co. 
Nosroc Corp. 





Reliance Insurance Co. 
Rock Wool Manufacturing Co. 
Royal Insurance Co. 
Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. 
Thorpe Insulations 
Turner & Newall PLC 
Unijax 
U.S. Gypsum 
Zurich-American Insurance Companies 
Confidential (5) 
VIII. Further InforDnation 
For additional information regarding the 
Asbestos Claims Facility, please contact 
Carolyn C. Tieger at (202) 833-8550. 
Ms. Tieger is a representative of Burson-
Marsteller, a Washington, D.C. public re-
lations firm. Her address is: International 
Square, 1825 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 950, 
Washington, D.C. 20006-5498. 
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